

Q1 *DNS over TCP (SU20 Final Q6)*

(20 points)

Standard DNS uses UDP to send all queries and responses. Consider a modified DNS that instead uses TCP for all queries and responses.

Q1.1 (3 points) Which of the following does DNS over TCP guarantee against a man-in-the-middle attacker? Select all that apply.

☐ Confidentiality

☐ Authenticity

☐ Integrity

☐ None of the above

Q1.2 (3 points) Compared to standard DNS, does DNS over TCP defend against more attacks, fewer attacks, or the same amount of attacks against an on-path attacker?

☐ More attacks

☐ Fewer attacks

☐ Same amount of attacks

Q1.3 (5 points) What fields does an off-path attacker **not know** and need to **guess** correctly to spoof a response in DNS over TCP? Assume source port randomization is enabled. Select all that apply.

☐ TCP sequence numbers

☐ Recursive resolver port

☐ DNS NS records

☐ Name server port

☐ DNS A records

☐ None of the above

Q1.4 (3 points) Is the Kaminsky attack possible on DNS over TCP? Assume source port randomization is disabled.

☐ Yes, because the attacker only needs to guess the DNS Query ID

☐ Yes, but we consider it infeasible for modern attackers

☐ No, because the attacker cannot force the victim to generate a lot of DNS over TCP requests

☐ No, because TCP has integrity guarantees



(Question 1 continued...)

Q1.5 (3 points) Recall the DoS amplification attack using standard DNS packets. An off-path attacker spoofs many DNS queries with the victim's IP, and the victim is overwhelmed with DNS responses.

Does this attack still work on DNS over TCP?


- ☐ Yes, the attack causes the victim to consume more bandwidth than the standard DNS attack
- ☐ Yes, the attack causes the victim to consume less bandwidth than the standard DNS attack
- ☐ No, because the DNS responses no longer provide enough amplification
- ☐ No, because the attacker cannot force the server to send DNS responses to the victim

Q1.6 (3 points) What type of off-path DoS attack from lecture is DNS over TCP vulnerable to, but standard DNS not vulnerable to? Answer in five words or fewer.

Q2 *Caltopia DNS (SP21 Final Q8)*

(13 points)

EvanBot is trying to determine the IP address of `caltopia.com` with DNS. However, some attackers on the network want to provide EvanBot with the wrong answer.



Assumptions:

- Each attacker is a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacker between their two neighbors on the diagram above.
- No attackers can perform a Kaminsky attack.
- Standard DNS (not DNSSEC) is used unless otherwise stated.
- No private keys have been compromised unless otherwise stated.
- In each subpart, both EvanBot's cache and the local resolver's cache start empty.
- Each subpart is independent.

Clarification during exam: Assume that bailiwick checking is in use for this entire question.

In each subpart, EvanBot performs a DNS query for the address of `caltopia.com`.

Q2.1 (4 points) In this subpart only, assume the attackers only passively observe messages.

Which of the attackers would observe an **A** record with the IP address of `caltopia.com` as a result of EvanBot's query? Select all that apply.

- ☐ Attacker 1 ☐ Attacker 3 ☐ None of the above
- ☐ Attacker 2 ☐ Attacker 4

Q2.2 (3 points) Which of the attackers can poison the local resolver's cached record for `cs161.org` by injecting a record into the additional section of the DNS response? Select all that apply.

Note: Attacker 1 has intentionally been left out as an answer choice.

- ☐ Attacker 2 ☐ Attacker 4
- ☐ Attacker 3 ☐ None of the above

(Question 2 continued...)

Q2.3 (4 points) Assume that the resolver and the name servers all validate DNSSEC, but EvanBot does not validate DNSSEC. Which of the attackers can poison EvanBot's cached record for **caltopia.com** by modifying the DNS response? Select all that apply.

☐ Attacker 1

☐ Attacker 3

☐ None of the above

☐ Attacker 2

☐ Attacker 4

Q2.4 (2 points) TRUE OR FALSE: DNSSEC prevents Attacker 4 from learning the IP address of **caltopia.com**.

☐ TRUE

☐ FALSE